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Economists tend to agree that the recent cutting of dividends taxes will 
encourage investment and reduce financial distress.  In addition to 
creating these “benefits,” however, the tax cut can also increase 
governance costs.  For example, by removing a bias for leveraged 
capital structures, the tax cut foregoes debt’s superiority on at least 
three dimensions:    
 
1.  Evaluating and monitoring demanders of financial capital;  
2. Constraining  managerial  agents’ from opportunistically 
employing capital market proceeds; and  
3.  Encouraging non-financial stakeholders (e.g., employees, 
suppliers) to make firm-specific investments.   
 
Moreover, because these privately produced services contribute to the 
integrity of broader financial markets (i.e., a public good), competitive 
forces may not fully counter the tax cut’s governance consequences.     
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  11.  Introduction 
Economists tend to agree that the US’s recent cutting of dividends taxes maintains 
considerable expansionary potential.  By treating dividends as taxable distributions and 
interest payments as deductible expenses, the pre-cut code biased capital structures 
towards debt.  This bias arguably reduced the economy’s productive capacity by 
distorting investment decisions and increasing financial distress costs.  Federal Reserve 
Board chair Alan Greenspan thus “spoke warmly” in recent congressional testimony 
“about the benefits of eliminating the double taxation of dividends” (The Economist 
2003, p. 31).     
But these benefits may be offset (at least partially) by an increase in associated 
governance costs.
1  Our objective for the present article is to highlight several channels 
through which cutting the dividends tax can create unintended consequences in this 
regard.
2   
One such channel concerns the relatively rich set of information that emerges from 
debt-holders’ relationship with financial capital demanders.  Holders of privately placed 
debt (e.g., banks) can face a lesser free-rider problem than do those of publicly placed 
equity when attempting to produce evaluation and monitoring services.  By removing a 
bias towards debt-heavy capital structures, the dividends tax cut can thus exacerbate 
information asymmetries between suppliers and demanders of loanable funds, thereby 
foreclosing at the margin otherwise mutually beneficial capital market trades. 
                                                 
1 Throughout our note, we employ the term “governance” in reference to institutions that help “overcome 
the incentive problems between an entrepreneur or manager and outside financiers” (Vives 2000, p. 4).     
2 Morck (2003) investigates how cutting the tax on intercorporate dividends can exacerbate governance 
costs.  We depart from Morck by investigating how tax treatments of individual dividends can influence 
governance.   
  2Information asymmetries may grow even further if, in the face of a tax cut, dividends 
distributions do not fully offset associated interest payment reductions.  Debt contracts 
create a relatively strong incentive for managers to disburse “free cash flows,” and can 
thus check even loosely monitored managers’ capacity to employ residual earnings in a 
manner that opposes shareholders’ interests.   
Finally, cutting the dividends tax can magnify the potential for owners to play morally 
hazardous actions.  By expanding the capacity for residual claimants to expropriate 
returns from “firm-specific” investments,
3 removing a policy-bias for debt finance can 
discourage non-equity stakeholders (e.g., employees, suppliers) from optimally 
employing their efforts.  Relative to equity claim holders, debt holders pose little threat 
here since their contracts essentially cap the residual earnings that can feasibly be 
extracted from firms.  In other words, debt holders’ potential to opportunistically 
expropriate the product of firm specific investments is likely to be less than that of 
associated equity holders.  By removing the bias for firms to finance projects via debt 
obligations, and thus increasing (non-owner) stakeholders’ exposure to opportunistic 
expropriation, cutting the dividends tax can again discourage productive economic 
activity.    
Debates over how the dividends tax cut might affect such activity tend to focus on the 
technical merits of removing capital structure distortions.  In doing so, however, they 
ignore how these same distortions can influence the economy’s stock of governance 
services.   
                                                 
3 “Firm specific” investments are those whose productivity is especially sensitive to the environment in 
which they are undertaken.   
  3Ultimately, this ignorance may prove innocuous.  Indeed, benefits from reduced 
distortions and financial distress may very well overwhelm any associated governance 
costs.  If they do not, however, then the cut’s welfare consequences may rest on how 
strongly private governance production responds.   
Here, we recognize the incentive for firms to substitute for governance services that 
were produced via biased capital structures.  We are less impressed, however, about this 
incentive’s magnitude.  First, to the extent that firm-level governance influences others’ 
financial market credibility (i.e., a public good),
4 decentralized forces will not push firms 
to replace governance services that are lost to less-leveraged capital structures.  Second, 
private organizational mechanisms may be relatively high cost producers of substitute 
governance services.  This potential appears especially important in the short run where, 
in the tax cut’s immediate wake, firms must learn to produce substitutes via extra-capital 
structure factors.   
We develop these arguments more carefully in our article’s remainder.  We begin in 
the following section by summarizing the distortion-reducing merits of a dividends tax 
cut – i.e., its capacity to increase investment and reduce financial distress.  We then argue 
in Section 3 that a potentially important cost of creating these benefits is foregoing the 
relatively low level of moral hazard that debt-heavy capital structures can achieve.  In 
Section 4, we address a “governance-counterargument” – namely, that the cut encourages 
firms to signal financial integrity by pursuing a more informative dividend policy.  Here, 
we draw on a “money burning” argument from the literature to highlight how cutting the 
dividends tax might instead exacerbate adverse selection problems in this regard.   
                                                 
4 In light of market reactions to recent governance scandals (e.g., those associated with Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco), this influence appears considerable.   
  4Finally, we conclude in Section 5 by suggesting that, even holding distributional concerns 
aside, cutting the dividends tax may not be the dominant strategy that many economists 
understand it to be.   
2.  Dividends Taxes, Investment, and Financial Distress 
Economists identify at least two channels through which taxing dividends can dampen 
productive activity: dividends taxes (i) weigh on investment and (ii) bias capital 
structures so as to increase exposure to financial distress.  Viewed in this light, cutting the 
dividends tax appears attractive.   
First, taxing residual earnings when firms report them as operating profits and 
distribute them as dividends makes equity a relatively costly mechanism for funding 
investment.  This cost “artificially” reduces an economy’s supply of loanable funds and 
thus increases equilibrium interest rates.  Confronted with this increase, firms will 
optimally forego otherwise profitable projects.
5   
Second, by raising the relative cost of equity finance, dividends taxes encourage firms 
to bias their capital structures toward debt.  And since default-risk increases with 
leverage, distorted reliance on debt financing can magnify the effects of economic 
shocks.  To see this implication, notice that debt securities are “fixed price contracts” in 
that their promise of remuneration is independent of firm performance.  But fixed price 
contracts entail relatively high renegotiation costs and are thus inferior to their cost-plus 
counterparts (e.g., equity contracts) in uncertain environments (Bajari and Tadelis 2001).   
                                                 
5 Moreover, dividends taxes can distort intertemporal and intersectoral capital allocations (Poterba and 
Summers 1984).   
  53. Dividends  Taxes  can  Reduce Moral Hazard  
In this light, cutting the dividends tax might look like a dominant strategy.  However, by 
removing a bias towards debt-heavy capital structures, this policy change can also reduce 
an economy’s equilibrium level of governance services.  And rather than being marginal, 
these forgone services may be considerable.  After all, if the pre-cut tax code created only 
distortionary costs (e.g., those outlined in our Section 2), then why are US firms 
competitive against those who do not face such costs?
6   
A.  Debt finance facilitates monitoring 
One benefit from biasing the tax code for debt capital comes from encouraging firms 
to accept relatively high levels of monitored finance.  Capital suppliers face an important 
free-rider problem when attempting to produce evaluation and monitoring services.   
Banks and other private lenders, however, face a relatively small problem in this regard 
because they largely internalize the benefits that their governance services produce (e.g., 
see James 1987, Lummer and McConnell 1989).  Suppliers of equity capital do not enjoy 
this comparative advantage.  In spite of its distortionary costs, then, a tax code’s bias 
towards debt financing can benefit an economy by encouraging private capital structures 
to mitigate public information asymmetries.   
The extent to which cutting the dividends tax diminishes governance through this 
channel depends, however, on whether it pushes equity financing to substitute for 
monitored (i.e., privately placed) or publicly placed debt (e.g., see Diamond 1991).  If 
equity financing largely displaces public debt (for which it is a closer substitute), then 
cutting the dividends tax is unlikely to create a significant change in how firms’ capital 
                                                 
6 Fama (1985) similarly motivates his search for bank loans’ non-obvious benefits.  In short, he argues that 
these benefits must exist since banks are competitive despite their regulation-inflated cost structure.   
  6structures produce governance services.  However, monitored debt constitutes an 
overwhelming share of even large firms’ external funds (Houston and James 2001, Mayer 
1990).  In other words, even for firms where monitored debt’s demand is relatively low, 
little or no replaceable public debt may actually exist.  Here, “governance-poor” equity 
securities exhibit at least a marginal capacity to replace “governance-rich” private debt.      
B.  Debt finance limits discretion over cash flows 
The dividends tax cut also maintains more impervious channels through which to 
exacerbate governance difficulties.  These difficulties may grow, for example, if 
increased dividend distributions do not offset reduced interest payments.  Debt contracts 
force managers to disburse “free cash flows,” and thereby check even loosely monitored 
managers’ capacity to engage in self-indulgent behavior (Jensen 1986).
7   After all, 
managers must have resources available with which to fund morally hazardous actions.  
Dividend distributions, on the other hand, are more discretionary, and thus place a weaker 
constraint on manager-agents in this regard.  Here, the tax cut exhibits, ceteris paribus, a 
more immediate potential to weaken corporate governance.   
This potential is especially interesting in light of the governance-benefits that some 
see in cutting the dividends tax.  Proponents argue that the cut will limit public access to 
“free cash flows” and thus mitigate the agency problem between electoral constituencies 
and their political representatives.  But the same type of principal-agent problem that 
makes constituency-representative relationships costly also makes shareholder-manager 
relationships costly.  Hence, while potentially mitigating agency costs that emerge from 
                                                 
7 Jensen’s (1986) ‘control hypothesis’ suggests that debt can serve as an efficiency-enhancing commitment 
device.  Committing free cash flows may be especially valuable in mature industries where cash generation 
is high proportional to investment opportunities. 
  7constituency-representative relationships, cutting the dividends tax could increase agency 
costs by expanding managerial discretion over shareholder resources.   
C.  Debt finance can encourage firm-specific investment 
Finally, the dividends tax cut might reduce non-financial stakeholders’ (e.g., 
employees, suppliers) incentive to make “specific investments.”  Specific investments 
confer disproportionate benefits onto the firm in which they are made – i.e., they are 
difficult to market externally.  Once stakeholders sink resources into such investments, 
then, residual claimants (e.g., financiers) are tempted to expropriate associated returns.
8  
Here, again, the dividends tax cut can exacerbate governance problems – this time by 
increasing productive investments’ exposure to the prospect of opportunistic 
expropriation.   
To see this temptation more clearly, consider the case of equity shareholders accepting 
a hostile takeover bid.  Contributors to both the academic and popular presses frequently 
interpret associated increases in target share prices as evidence that takeovers expand 
firms’ production possibilities.  Shleifer and Summers (1989) recognize, however, that 
the tendency for target share prices to increase with hostile bids may also reflect the 
capacity for takeover to redistribute (rather than increase) a firm’s product.  The post 
takeover firm may, for example, realize an increased ability to renegotiate wage contracts 
and thus redistribute residual earnings from employees to owners. 
This feature of equity financing can retard efficiency since, confronted with the 
prospect of opportunistic redistributions, employees, suppliers, and other non-capital 
stakeholders have relatively little incentive to make otherwise optimal firm-specific 
                                                 
8 Williamson (1985) highlights the importance of structuring governance mechanisms with an eye toward 
the gains from employing “specific” assets. 
  8investments.
9  Debt capital, on the other hand, shelters stakeholders from this exposure 
(e.g., see Burkart et al. 1997).  By limiting themselves to fixed payments from residual 
earnings, debt holders pose relatively little threat to expropriating proceeds that are 
necessary for motivating specific investments. 
4.  Can Dividends Taxes Increase Asymmetric Information?   
In each of these cases, cutting the dividends tax appears capable of diminishing private 
incentives to produce governance services.  The cut’s proponents argue, however, that the 
policy change’s removal of tax distortions can reduce information asymmetries that 
might otherwise keep loanable funds from finding their highest productivity application.  
In short, they argue that the tax cut’s push for equity-financing strengthens governance by 
heightening firms’ incentives to signal financial health via their dividend policy.
10   
This argument ignores, however, a necessary condition for signals to be informative – 
i.e., the tax cut must increase the difference in costs that “good” and “bad” firms incur 
from distributing residual earnings as dividends.  But, rather than exhibiting this type of 
asymmetry, the tax cut reduces distribution costs for all types of firms.   
Moreover, cutting the dividends tax can arguably increase the cost that firms face 
when attempting to inform capital markets about their financial integrity.  For example, 
suppose that paying dividends looks more like “money burning” when such distributions 
are taxed twice.  Then, if the cost of distress financing does not vary with a firm’s type, 
information that emerges from dividend distributions increases with the rate of double-
taxation.  This result obtains because common knowledge of a dividends tax reduces the 
                                                 
9 That such an exposure can considerably retard firms’ productivity is well documented (e.g., see Miller 
1991). 
10 Vice President Cheney (2003) argues, for example, that “Abolishing the double taxation on dividends 
will…transform corporate behavior… and encourage responsible practices.”   
  9potential for market participants to interpret associated payments as anything but a signal 
of quality (Bernheim and Redding 2001).     
5. Conclusion 
While the dividends tax cut’s technical benefits are widely appreciated, its potential 
governance costs remain largely ignored.  This ignorance is important since cutting the 
dividends tax can work against private capital structures producing governance services, 
and firms are unlikely to respond either fully or quickly to this negative force.  First, if 
privately produced governance contributes to broader market integrity, then policy’s that 
bias capital structures towards producing governance services can sustain superior levels 
of social welfare.  Indeed, absent such a bias, firms face a reduced (if any) incentive to 
produce governance services at levels that exceed those that are privately optimal.   
Second, to the extent that firms substitute for foregone features of governance-rich capital 
structures, they are likely to do so slowly.  An unbiased capital structure represents a new 
technology with which to produce governance services, and firms will recognize 
adjustment costs while learning to employ this alternative mechanism.  Governance costs 
associated with the tax cut may thus be especially important in the short run.  In either 
case, productivity changes associated with the tax cut are likely to be less positive than 
those that are popularly reported, and may even be negative.   
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